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EQUALITY AND ACCESS TO CREDIT:
A SOCIAL CONTRACT FRAMEWORK
JOHN LINARELLI*
I
INTRODUCTION
Most Americans assume that debt is mainly about transaction and choice in
a market.1 But in the United States and some other advanced economies, debt is
much more than some isolated transactions independent of government policy.
Debt is often what social scientists and philosophers describe as a social good, the
distribution of which determines the life chances of individuals, children, and
entire families. The social good aspect of debt has not been lost on governments
and politicians. In many advanced economies and particularly in the United
States, debt—or its converse, access to credit—is predominantly social and
political, with extensive government involvement in deciding who gets credit and
who does not. A substantial amount of private debt in the United States is
subsidized or guaranteed by the federal government.2 The Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac), two government sponsored enterprises (GSEs),
guarantee about $7 trillion in U.S. home mortgage debt, over ninety percent of
all mortgage debt in the country.3 Even after the last financial crisis in 2008–2009,
the U.S. federal government remains substantially involved in making the
mortgage securitization market possible, which fuels the very existence of the
thirty-year fixed rate mortgage. Extensive federal regulation of the market,
including an array of disclosure laws, regulation of terms and transaction
structures, and laws banning discrimination in lending, has existed for quite some
time.4
Institutions in American society enforce what sociologist Rachel Dwyer
characterizes as a credit-welfare state tradeoff: subsidized debt promotes well-

Copyright © 2021 by John Linarelli.
This Article is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
* Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. My deepest appreciation to
participants at the Financial Inclusion, Access to Credit, and Sustainable Finance symposium hosted by
Durham University Law School on May 28, 2019 for valuable comments. All errors are mine.
1. See SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT POLICIES
UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 4 (2011) (claiming that because the majority of government aid
is an in-direct subsidy, many taxpayers are unaware of the significant impact the aid has on the market).
2. SARAH L. QUINN, AMERICAN BONDS: HOW CREDIT MARKETS SHAPED A NATION (2019).
3. Bruce Mizrach & Christopher J. Neely, Fed Intervention in the To-Be-Announced Market for
Mortgage-Backed Securities, ECON. SYNOPSES, Apr., 2020, at 1.
4. See discussion infra Part II.
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being and social mobility in lieu of a strong set of public benefits programs.5 This
is a precarious tradeoff, which makes people and families vulnerable. The
tradeoff converts duties of justice owed collectively to persons into contractual
obligations owed individually by persons. Debtor-creditor relationships tend to
be unequal by their very nature and structure.6 Usually the debt underlying this
imbalanced relationship is secured debt that can be over four times annual
household income, such as the home mortgage.7 But if a family is excluded from
the benefits of secured debt the result is the opposite: a credit-based society in
which credit is a resource that contributes to inequalities.8 About 45 million
Americans lack a credit score as of 2015, essentially excluding them from
accessing credit.9
The winners and losers that the law determines in a debt-for-well-being
society can reproduce invidious forms of racial or other discrimination, causing
grave injustice and substantial harm for many persons, families, and
communities—harm that spans across generations. In the pre-civil rights era of
the twentieth century, governments used law to block African-Americans from
obtaining home mortgages by deeming them too risky and through a practice
known as redlining—the exclusion of entire minority communities from
mortgage credit.10 Governments have historically structured markets to achieve
injustice with intergenerational consequences.
Beyond the normative issues of fairness or justice in the credit system, some
regulatory design is ineffective at producing even the most basic levels of
consumer protection. As Part II of this Article explores, the primary mode of
regulation in financial markets is disclosure. The problems with disclosure have
mainly to do with cognition: the limited ability of persons to be able to use and
process information to make informed lending decisions. Substantial evidence in
repeat studies informs that mandatory disclosure fails to protect consumers.11
Attempts to infuse more paternalistic structures into the debt contract risks
increasing the costs of credit for lenders which may cause them to exit the credit

5. Rachel E. Dwyer, Credit, Debt, and Inequality, 44 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 237, 245 (2018).
6. Id. at 238.
7. What is a debt-to-income ratio? Why is the 43% debt-to-income ratio important?, CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-debt-to-income-ratio-why-isthe-43-debt-to-income-ratio-important-en-1791/ [https://perma.cc/4EG2-TNVF].
8. See Dwyer, supra note 5, at 243 (“[S]ecured debt in a context of a weak welfare state enables
households with modest means to build wealth over time, and exclusion from such opportunities
contributes to inequalities in attainment and wealth accumulation.”).
9. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, DATA POINT: CREDIT INVISIBLES 15 (2015), https://files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/201505_cfpb_data-point-credit-invisibles.pdf [https://perma.cc/2A9F-FQRL].
10. See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 16–17 (2017) (explaining the practice of red-lining and the
discriminatory impact it had on black communities).
11. See discussion infra Part II.A.

10_LINARELLI_EQUALITY & ACCESS TO CREDIT (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1 2021]

EQUALITY AND ACCESS TO CREDIT

2/28/2021 1:11 PM

167

market in areas where credit is needed most. Finance has a way of easily moving
credit around to seek the higher returns and lower risk.12
Call it the tragedy of contract. The core of debt is contract. A mix of
normative and cognitive problems can lead to the dismal conclusion: it is very
difficult to regulate access to credit in a way that both fairly distributes credit as
a resource in a society, while also ensuring that debtors are respected as
autonomous agents who avoid unsustainable levels of debt. Both these problems
concern fairness. Regulating the terms of the debt contract has to do with
transactional fairness, which is an attempt to make consumers assent to a contract
that is psychologically sensible to persons. The distribution question concerns
substantive fairness: access to credit is what John Rawls called a social primary
good and leads to access to other social primary goods, requiring a fair
distribution in a society along egalitarian lines.13
Part II of this Article explores the cognitive limitations that people encounter
in making credit decisions. Regulatory disclosure mandates are generally
ineffective at improving the choices people make about debt. People do not read
contracts and what they do read they often fail to understand. The contract
model, which puts overwhelming cognitive demands on people, is preordained to
fail. Creditors will not disclose what they do not have to, and they sometimes
engage in psychological manipulation to entice people to take on debt. Part II
also examines why more paternalistic attempts to regulate the actual terms and
conditions of debt products are often ineffective.
Part III explores the normative questions of why access to credit is an
important social good in a society that creates access to other important social
goods such as housing, education, and intergenerational well-being. The current
framework, which denies that access to credit is an important social good, puts
persons and households in a precarious and vulnerable position, fails to meet
goals of well-understood theories of distributive justice, and leads to a denial of
liberty for individuals in the form of domination by creditors. The conclusion is
clear: either develop a set of tools to incorporate the values of equality into the
consumer lending markets, or remove debt from the basic structure of society
and eliminate its role as a social good that allocates well-being. Societies must be
careful not to over-financialize their citizens.14 Financialization requires the
recognition of justice as a priority for law and policy on access to credit.

12. See KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND
INEQUALITY 199 (2019) (“Spotting opportunities to make money on the hope of others is what
intermediaries do, and their business is leveraging up in the expectation of future returns.”).
13. See discussion infra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.
14. See generally GUIDO COMPARATO, THE FINANCIALISATION OF THE CITIZEN SOCIAL AND
FINANCIAL INCLUSION THROUGH EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (2018) (discussing the concept of
financialization).
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II
COGNITIVE DIFFICULTIES IN REGULATING THE DEBT CONTRACT
This Part discusses the cognitive obstacles preventing humans from making
good credit decisions. Though these cognitive obstacles are now well understood,
legal scholars have offered little by way of policy prescriptions to work around
them. The immediate reaction among many who want to protect weaker parties
to debt contracts is to impose restrictions on lenders, but such moves risk
restricting access to credit.15 This is not a solution in a world where access to credit
is embedded in the basic structure of a society as necessary for household and
intergenerational flourishing.16 Legal scholars and regulators appear to embrace
a resigned attitude toward the situation and do not pursue bold solutions. Oren
Bar Gill argues that the focus on disclosure mandates is not because it is always
the “optimal form of regulatory intervention” but because it is the “least intrusive
form of regulation and, thus, the form of regulation most likely to be adopted.”17
We seem stuck in the tragedy of contract. This resignation appears to be at work
in the private law for consumer contracts, in which conspicuous notice of contract
terms is beginning to replace mutual assent as sufficient to form a contract
online.18
This failure to pursue bold strategies is a predictable outcome in the social
science (as opposed to normative) approaches dominating legal scholarship. The
analytical and empirical methods being used are suitable for identifying problems
but not for furnishing a normative framework by which to evaluate and design
regulation. We cannot ask social science to do much more than identify problems.
The study of justice has become less important, often labeled as a question that
15. See John Linarelli, Debt in Just Societies: A General Framework for Regulating Credit, 14
REGUL. GOVERNANCE 409, 409 (2020) (“[A]ccess to credit is a ‘resource’ in many societies, which means
that it is a primary method by which persons develop and implement plans for their lives.”).
16. Id.
17. OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN
CONSUMER MARKETS 32 (2012).
18. See Meyer v. Uber Tech. Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2017) (noting that an offeree is bound
by an agreement regardless of actual notice to a term if the term if the term was clear and conspicuous
enough that a reasonably prudent user would be on inquiry notice). On these issues is it worth reviewing
the considerable debates around the Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts, which the
American Law Institute completed in 2019. See generally Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar & Florencia
Marotta-Wurgler, Searching for the Common Law: The Quantitative Approach of the Restatement of
Consumer Contracts, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 7 (2017) (outlining the empirical approach taken to construct
the Restatement of Consumer Contracts); Gregory Klass, Empiricism and Privacy Policies in the
Restatement of Consumer Contract Law, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 45 (2019) (arguing that the new
restatements coding has obscured the judgment calls necessary to properly code decisions and their
persuasive power); Adam J. Levitin, Nancy S. Kim, Christina L. Kunz, Peter Linzer, Patricia A. McCoy,
Juliet M. Moringiello, Elizabeth A. Renuart, & Lauren E. Willis, The Faulty Foundation of the Draft
Restatement of Consumer Contracts, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 447 (2019) (arguing that the coding of the
restatement relied on irrelevant cases and thus does not adequately restate the law of contracts); Brian
Wolfman, Opposition to the draft Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts, PUB. CITIZEN:
CONSUMER L. & POL’Y BLOG (May 2, 2019), https://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2019/05/opposition-tothe-draft-restatement-of-the-law-of-consumer-contracts.html
[https://perma.cc/H6B4-3RWP]
(endorsing Adam Levitin’s critique on the draft of the Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts).

10_LINARELLI_EQUALITY & ACCESS TO CREDIT (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1 2021]

EQUALITY AND ACCESS TO CREDIT

2/28/2021 1:11 PM

169

is rhetorical or about personal opinion.19 As we shall discover in Part III below,
fully developed theories about justice and equality could be put to use in
evaluating financial regulation.20 For now, let us survey the current state of affairs
on regulatory design for access to credit.
A. The Failure of Mandated Disclosure
Disclosure has been the approach of choice in attempting to solve the
problems of fairness in consumer financial services. The seventy-third United
States Congress “invented” disclosure and made the United States the first
country to mandate disclosure in financial transactions. Various provisions in the
Securities Act of 1933 regulated the issuance of new investment products known
as securities, and provisions in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 regulated
the sale of securities after initial issuance, in the secondary markets.21 Conversely,
the United Kingdom did not take government regulation of financial services
seriously until 1985, with the creation of the now long-defunct Securities and
Investment Board.22 The 1933 and 1934 “Securities Acts” in the United States
influenced the style and method for securities and financial regulation to follow
in the United States and in other countries.23
The 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts were not limited to consumer transactions,
a concept that did not exist at the time. The core regulatory concept for American
financial markets rests on disclosure, both in their regulation of securities issuers
and in setting legal standards for suits to recover for various forms of fraud in the
sale and purchase of securities. Substantial reasons support disclosure mandates
19. See Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 899, 933–34
(2009). These arguments go back to Bentham.
20. See discussion infra Part II.
21. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74, 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-209, 48 Stat. 881, 889 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78).
22. See Sam Scott Miller, Regulating Financial Services in the United Kingdom—An American
Perspective, 44 BUS. LAW. 323, 330, 336 (1989) (“The failure of several investment advisory and
commodity firms following their misappropriation of customers’ funds earlier in the 1980’s created a call
for new legislation.”).
23. The European Union has also mandated a significant disclosure regime with which EU member
states must comply. There have been a number of critiques on the EU’s over-reliance on disclosure. For
critiques, see generally Ognyn Seizov et al., The Transparent Trap: A Multidisciplinary Perspective on the
Design of Transparent Online Disclosures in the EU, 42 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 149 (2018) (arguing that a
lack of guidance on how disclosures must be formulated leaves too much discretion to traders); Emilios
Avgouleas, What Future for Disclosure as a Regulatory Technique? Lessons from Behavioural Decision
Theory and the Global Financial Crisis, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 211 (Iain MacNeil
& Justin O’Brien eds., Hart 2010) (arguing that disclosure will only be effective if in conjunction with
supplemented with protected regulations); Emilios Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis and the
Disclosure Paradigm in European Financial Regulation: The Case for Reform, 6 EUROPEAN CO. & FIN.
L. REV. 440 (2009) (arguing that an independent financial products committee could be a better
protection strategy then enhanced disclosure). In a related vein about sales law. See Omri Ben-Shahar &
Oren Bar-Gill, Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection: A Critique of European Consumer
Contract Law, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 109 (2013) (arguing that the Common European Sales Law
will likely impede cross border trade, prevent consumers access cross markets and create disharmony in
the member states’ laws).
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for public securities markets, which go beyond the paternalism rationales
associated with protection of purchasers of securities. These reasons have mainly
to do with making markets more efficient by promoting the disclosure of
information that institutional investors will incorporate into their valuations of
securities. This argument finds its rationale in the efficient capital markets
theories and in Friedrich Hayek’s The Use of Knowledge in Society.24
While mandated disclosure for securities rests only partly on a consumer
protection rationale, particularly the protection of individual investors, the
rationale for mandated disclosure in consumer financial products is designed
primarily to protect the consumer. The “protect the market” rationale has some
force in the regulation of credit products, but less than it has in securities markets,
as it cannot as reliably rest on the notion of rational transactors in credit markets
as it can for securities markets, in which institutional investors are the main
consumers of information.
In consumer lending, a formidable patchwork of federal and state laws,
starting with the Truth in Lending Act in 1968, mandate disclosure by lenders in
some form to borrowers.25 This is particularly the case for mortgage lending,
which connects to a primary source of wealth for many households in the United
States and in other countries that promote individual homeownership. Current
post-global financial crisis legislation in the United States mandating disclosure
includes the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act26 for
home mortgages and the Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and
Disclosure (CARD) Act27 for credit cards, though these acts go further and
engage in some product regulation.28
Recent empirical research on online consumer contracts offers evidence that
disclosure mandates fail because people do not read terms and conditions.29 The
24. See generally Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 529
(1945).
25. Space prohibits listing them all here. See generally Anne Fleming, The Long History of “Truth
in Lending”, 30 J. POL’Y HIST. 236 (2018) (outlining the history and development of mandatory disclosure
rules); Kathleen C. Engel & Patrick A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of
Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002) (articulating the market structures that have incentivized
private lending).
26. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
27. See generally Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure (Credit CARD) Act
of 2009, Pub. L. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734.
28. See infra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
29. See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF
MANDATED DISCLOSURE 7 (2016) (“Mandated disclosure fails because it depends on a long chain of
fragile links. It works only if three actors – lawmakers, disclosures, and discloses – play demanding parts
deftly.”); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Even More Than You Wanted to Know About the Failures of
Disclosure, 11 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 63, 63 (2015) (“Nobody reads fine print – even when it
matters.”); Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine
Print? Consumer Attention to Standard Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (2014) (finding in their
study that less than 1% of users actually read the licensing agreement when online shopping). See
generally Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168 J. INST. & THEORETICAL
ECON. 94 (2012) (arguing mandatory disclosure will not likely put competitive pressure on sellers);
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evidence these studies have developed can be reasonably extended to contracting
for credit, much of which now happens online.30 Many people have difficulties
with financial literacy.31 And the argument that people who enter into online
contracts are rationally ignorant rests on a by now well-understood false
assumption that people are rational. There is now overwhelming evidence, in
behavioral economics and in psychology and the behavioral sciences more
generally, putting in deep suspicion the notion that we should rest policy law
reform on a spurious conception of the person as rational.32 The main dissenter
from the view that mandated disclosure fails is Oren Bar-Gill, who contends that
product use disclosure, particularly disclosure of individual as opposed to
statistically determined average uses of credit products, may be effective.33 BarGill’s work appears to apply to credit cards and other forms of revolving credits
in which use patterns develop.
Except perhaps for this limited case, mandated disclouse fails.
But let us be clear on what mandated disclosure in consumer finance is meant
to fix. It is meant to assist contract parties in positions of disparate bargaining
power or at disparate levels of sophistication. Mandated disclosure is intended to
support a person’s autonomy as a contract party. It has really nothing to do with
distributive justice. Laws that protect the vulnerable or persons with little
bargaining power are aimed at fairness in individual transactions. Distributive
justice has a broader role, focusing not on the individual responsibility of the
parties to each transaction but on the social responsibility members of a society
have to structure their credit markets fairly. At best, if mandated disclosure
works—a big “if”—it might accidently achieve some distributive justice. But we
need methods more precisely designed to focus on distributive justice.

Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Some Realities of Online Contracting, 19 S. CT. ECON. REV. 11 (2011)
(discussing the policy implications of End User License Agreements); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E.
Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011) (arguing mandatory
disclosure leads to unintended consequences and harms those it aims to protect).
30. See Lauren Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory
Lending: Pricing, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 727 (2006) (“The prices for their other products usually do not
differ greatly and are made easily accessible to the applicant who wants to price shop, frequently though
the newspaper or internet.”).
31. See BAR-GILL, supra note 17, at 161 (“[M]any individuals are not well informed and
knowledgeable about their terms of borrowing.”). For a survey, see Angelo Capuano & Ian Ramsey,
Financial Literacy Project, What Causes Suboptimal Financial Behavior? An Exploration of Financial
Literacy, Social Influences and Behavioral Economics (Univ. of Melbourne L. Sch., Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 540, 2011) https://ssrn.com/abstract=1793502 [https://perma.cc/QX62-C5JP].
32. See, e.g., Dan Ariely, The End of Rational Economics, HARV. BUS. REV., Jul.–Aug. 2009, at 78
(criticizing the standard economic theory of rational actors).
33. See BAR-GILL, supra note 17 at 14–15 (“‘[P]erfect knowledge of one’s preferences cannot simply
be assumed.’ The central role of use levels as an object of misperception thus highlights the value of a
behavioral-economics approach.”).
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B. Why Product Regulation is Difficult
Governmental regulation of credit products goes beyond disclosure. And
sometimes these regulations exist in conjunction with mandated disclosure.34 For
example, the CARD Act includes a number of provisions regulating credit card
terms, including banning double cycle billing, allocating payments to the balance
bearing the lowest interest rate first, automatically enrolling cardholders in over
the limit programs, and forbidding activity fees and convenience fees.35 Under
the CARD Act, penalty fees must be reasonable and proportional.36 It is
important to frame these provisions as regulating the terms of products, rather
than the terms of contracts, to signify that contract in its classical form is not really
at work in the credit market. Rather than bargaining on a bespoke contract,
borrowers are buying pre-determined terms and conditions, in the form of the
adhesion contract.37
There is some doubt that product regulation is effective. From the standpoint
of economic theory, if regulation increases the cost of lending and reduces the
return, lenders may move their money to more favorable rates of return. This is
the theory, but we continue to learn that too many variables cast doubt on its
simple logic. It does not account for the fact that consumer lending markets
comprise a significant array of market opportunities in the United States; that
lenders can structure transactions to mitigate or even eliminate risk through
intermediation,38 which is subsidized in the home mortgage market; and that
sometimes industry prefers regulation when it reduces risk and particularly when
industry has influence over the regulatory process.
Like mandated disclosure, product regulation fails to address issues of
equality. It reflects a more paternalistic view of credit market regulation than
mandated disclosure does. It rests on assumptions that people are boundedly
rational and do not understand credit products even if disclosures are made. But
it has nothing to do with equality or distributive justice in the credit markets. It
has to do with the structure of transactions and not the structure of markets.
III
INTRODUCING EQUALITY INTO ACCESS TO CREDIT INSTITUTIONS
Much of the attention in access to credit and inequality has been to the
invidious problem of racial discrimination in lending, particularly in mortgage
34. E.g., The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act Rule, 12 C.F.R. § 1026.32 (defining and
regulating the terms of high cost mortgages); see generally Michael S. Barr, Modes of Credit Market
Regulation, in BUILDING WEALTH: CREATING WEALTH IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 206 (Nicholas
P. Restsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2005) (outlining five different types of credit market policies).
35. Credit CARD Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734, 1738, 1739, 1740, 1741, 1752
36. Id. at 1740.
37. See JANE MARGARET RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE
RULE OF LAW 31 (2014).
38. See PISTOR, supra note 12 at 136 (describing how the intermediary approach enables the legal
system of where the entity is incorporated to govern allowing entities to choose jurisdictions with more
favorable laws).
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lending.39 The Community Reinvestment Act was a substantial policy response
mainly to racial inequality.40 But an assessment of the Community Reinvestment
Act and the obvious moral wrongfulness of racist law and lending practices are
beyond the scope of this article. My focus here, rather, is on income and wealth
inequality. Some call these distinctions as between status and material inequality,
with status referring to the characteristics of persons based on morally arbitrary
categories such as race or ethnicity, and material inequality referring to income
and wealth.41 Of course, some overlap between these categories exists in societies
in which racial discrimination is practiced in lending. But inequality, apart from
racially discriminatory practices, is a problem worth addressing in a just society,
for economic, moral, and political reasons.42
The focus of this Part is on equality from a moral point of view as morality
applies to institutions. Why material inequality is objectionable is a big subject
beyond the scope of this Article and more for a purely philosophical treatment.
For our purposes, let us stipulate that law is a cooperative practice in which
persons subject to it are in a relationship or association of reciprocity and for
these reasons the law and other institutions in the society formed by this
cooperative and associative practice, including financial institutions, should not
cause or contribute to material inequality. This does not mean that inequality
might be objectionable if it arises from desert or natural endowments. As lawyers,
we deal in institutions, human-created social practices. The institutions we create
are subject to our moral duties to fellow citizens to not promote inequality.
Justice, a matter of moral concern in law and politics, comes first as a matter of
priority in public policy. We can reach a consensus as to what it is on the basis of
settled principles, and law can promote it, or not. The justice we are concerned
with here is distributive justice, moral ideas about the distribution of burdens and
benefits in a society.
The goal of this Part is methodological ground clearing to begin to develop
tools for evaluating access to credit issues. From the standpoint of distributive
justice, this Part aims to assist in developing a toolkit to understand what law and
economics calls distributional concerns. This toolkit will go beyond simply
39. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 10; MEHRSA BADARASAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK
BANKS AND THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP 115 (2019) (describing the how discrimination impeded lenders
ability to provide mortgages to segregated black communities); THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, TOXIC
INEQUALITY: HOW AMERICA’S WEALTH GAP DESTROYS MOBILITY, DEEPENS THE RACIAL DIVIDE,
AND THREATENS OUR FUTURE (2017).
40. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
41. See SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 213 (2019).
42. On this very general point some philosophers and economists seem to agree though their reasons
differ. See T.M. SCANLON, WHY DOES INEQUALITY MATTER (2018) (arguing that the value of equality
is non-instrumental, arising from the value of equality itself); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF
INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2013) (focusing on the
importance of fairness and equality in the economy). The political problem associated with inequality,
overlapping with moral problems, is domination by affluent groups and distortion of policy choices. See
generally MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL
POWER IN AMERICA (2012) (discussing how public preferences are both shaped by the elite and influence
policy outcomes).
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identifying the problem of distribution as a matter of social science empiricism
and then seeking to solve the problem through common sense or personal
preferences.
Rather, the focus here is on Rawls’s theory of justice.43 This Article does not
in any sense offer an exegetical treatment of Rawls, nor does it advocate a strict
adherence to Rawlsian approaches. Since Rawls wrote what is probably the most
important set of works in moral and political philosophy in the twentieth century,
a post-Rawlsian corpus on egalitarianism has proliferated. Rawls provides an
explicit scaffolding by which to understand why and in what circumstances
institutions, including law, should be designed to comply with principles of
justice. This scaffolding allows us to see clearly why law and other institutions
relevant to consumer finance are subject to evaluation using principles of
distributive justice.
A. Consumer Finance as a Site for Distributive Justice
The first question to ask is whether consumer finance is a site of distributive
justice.44 Not all areas of financial regulation are.45 In Rawlsian terms, consumer
finance is a site of justice if it is part of the “basic structure of society” and
necessary for a person in a society to obtain “social primary goods.”46 It is
unnecessary to hew closely to John Rawls’s work, but his conceptions are useful
here for articulating a framework to evaluate consumer financial regulation.
The basic structure of society is, according to Rawls, the “primary subject of
justice,” comprised of institutions that distribute the main benefits and burdens
in a society.47 The basic structure is “the way in which the major social institutions
fit together into one system, and how they assign fundamental rights and duties
and shape the division of advantages that arise through social cooperation.”48 It
includes the “legally recognized forms of property, and the organization of the
economy, and the nature of the family, all belong to the basic structure.”49
According to Samuel Freeman, one of Rawls’s former students and a leading
expositor of Rawls’s philosophy, the basic structure includes the law on “the
structure of the economy, including control of means of production and,
therewith, laws of property, contract, and other legal measures necessary for

43. See infra note 46–48 and accompanying text.
44. For an introduction to the site of justice notion, see generally G.A. Cohen, Where the Action Is:
On the Site of Distributive Justice, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1997), though I do not follow his argument.
45. See generally Linarelli, supra note 15 (proposing the implementation of a luck egalitarian
approach that takes equality into account while holding individuals responsible for their real choices).
46. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Harv. Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999); JOHN
RAWLS: JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed., Harv. Univ. Press 2d ed. 2001); JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (Colum. Univ. Press Expanded Ed. 2005).
47. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 46 at 7–11, 15, 54, 84.
48. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 46 at 258.
49. Id.
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economic production, exchange, and consumption; and certain norms that apply
to the family regarding the upbringing of children.”50
In a Rawlsian framework, distributive justice is about how the basic structure
of society distributes social primary goods. Social primary goods are those that
are essential for a person to be free and equal in a society and to pursue a good
life. Rawls identified “income and wealth” as examples of social primary goods.51
Moreover, in a society placing high priority on the accumulation of wealth
through private home ownership and the securing of public services through
private means, income and wealth are also relevant to the achievement of other
social primary goods such as the “social bases of self-respect” and freedom of
movement and choice of occupation in the context of economic opportunity.52
A broad interdisciplinary consensus has emerged that the institutions of
access to credit are part of the basic structure of American society and that they
distribute primary social goods. Recent sociological evidence supports these
findings.53 The American market for credit has historically been substantially
subsidized by the federal government.54 Legal scholars have gotten the point.
Here are just a few select examples. According to Patricia McCoy, “the evidence
shows that purchasing a home remains a powerful path – many would say the
most powerful path – to building wealth for families of modest means.”55 Adam
Levitin and Susan Wachter explain:
It is hard to overstate the importance of housing finance in modern life and in the
modern economy. The type of housing finance system we have determines our built
environment and the nature and quality of our lives as individuals. It determines where
and how we live. It determines who among us can become homeowners, and it
determines what kind of houses, what kind of neighborhoods, and what kind of
communities we live in. It even affects our ability to participate fully as citizens in our
local communities.56

Levitin and Wachter go on to explain the institution of the “American
Mortgage,” the thirty-year fixed rate mortgage created in the New Deal, which
only exists in the United States. The American Mortgage would not exist without
government involvement. Access to credit provides homeowners with other
social goods, besides homes that are essential to achieving distributive justice in
a society, such as access to good schools, a clean environment, and low-crime
50. SAMUEL FREEMAN, LIBERALISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 231 (2018).
51. See, e.g., RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 46 at 181.
52. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 46 at 58–59.
53. See Dwyer, supra note 5 at 239 (“Three principal approaches have emerged in research on credit
and debt that connect to strong traditions of research on inequality: credit and debt in shaping social
inclusion and exclusion, the influence of credit and debt on life chances, and credit and debt as elements
of opressive social relations.”). See generally QUINN, supra note 2 (arguing that increasing access to credit
may be more effective in providing citizens with means to acquire basic needs than government funded
social aid programs).
54. QUINN, supra note 2.
55. Patricia A. McCoy, Has the Mortgage Pendulum Swung Too Far? Reviving Access to Mortgage
Credit, 37 B.C. J. L. SOC. JUST. 213, 214 (2017).
56. ADAM J. LEVITIN & SUSAN M. WACHTER, THE GREAT AMERICAN HOUSING BUBBLE: WHAT
WENT WRONG AND HOW WE CAN PROTECT OURSELVES IN THE FUTURE 1 (2020).
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communities.57 These social goods could be delinked from access to credit for
homeownership through de-financialization. Other societies are so organized.58
But we have to deal with the realities of our society if we want our theorizing to
be realistic.
Yet still, popular mischaracterizations continue to circulate that housing
markets, the housing finance market, and more generally the consumer finance
market, somehow operate on their own and only occasionally require
government intervention. This is really an ideological narrative, or perhaps it is a
misunderstanding of what political scientist Suzanne Mettler calls the submerged
state, which underlies the contracts at work in financial markets.59 The disclosure
versus product regulation dichotomy reflects this ideology of intervention. The
intervention language is not helpful for understanding what is really happening
in these markets. Law does not intervene in financial markets. Law constitutes
financial markets.60 Except in some boundary circumstances, markets are just a
“bunch of rules.”61
If we adhere to the false narrative of naturally occurring markets in need of
occasional intervention, we risk classifying barriers to access to credit as a matter
for corrective justice—to correct particular cases of discrimination in lending on
an individual basis. Discrimination has been a serious problem in consumer
finance but there are also significant structural problems that need to be
addressed, including but not limited to structural racism. A focus on isolated
transactions is not enough. It is possible to have a mortgage transaction entirely
free of discrimination yet still problematic from a structural point of view. A full
accounting for justice is not simply about prohibiting denials of credit to
individuals, but about how the law shapes the market for credit, with a focus on
who gets it and who does not and why, even if individual lenders engage in no
discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity or any other factor.
57. Linarelli, supra note 15, at 412.
58. C.f. Leo Kaas, Georgi Kocharov, Edgar Preugschat & Nawid Siassi, Reasons for the low
homeownership rate in Germany, DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK: RESEARCH BRIEF (Jan. 14, 2020), https://
www.bundesbank.de/en/publications/research/research-brief/2020-30-homeownership-822176 [https://
perma.cc/59UY-8DVR] (explaining how Germany’s housing policies incentivize renting).
59. Mettler, supra note 1.
60. Pistor, supra note 12.
61. Robert Reich puts it succinctly:
[T]he “free market” is a bunch of rules about (1) what can be owned and traded (the genome?
slaves? nuclear materials? babies? votes?); (2) on what terms (equal access to the internet? the
right to organize unions? corporate monopolies? the length of patent protections? ); (3) under
what conditions (poisonous drugs? unsafe foods? deceptive Ponzi schemes? uninsured
derivatives? dangerous workplaces?) (4) what’s private and what’s public (police? roads? clean
air and clean water? healthcare? good schools? parks and playgrounds?); (5) how to pay for
what (taxes, user fees, individual pricing?). And so on.
These rules don’t exist in nature; they are human creations. Governments don’t “intrude”
on free markets; governments organize and maintain them. Markets aren’t “free” of rules; the
rules define them.
Robert Reich, The Myth of the “Free Market” and How to Make the Economy Work for Us, ROBERT
REICH (Sept. 16, 2013), https://robertreich.org/post/61406074983 [https://perma.cc/JWH9-FL6H].
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B. Principles of Distributive Justice for Consumer Finance
Having argued that principles of distributive justice have a role in the
structuring of consumer finance, the next question is: what are the principles?
How do we know when access to credit is good or bad from a distributional point
of view? Of course, a number of financial measures are used to evaluate access
to credit: credit scores, ability to pay requirements, loan to value ratios for
mortgages, loan to income ratios for mortgages, and so on. But these have to do
with finance and with individual loan applications and not with equality in the
distribution of credit opportunities. When it comes to understanding what it
means to say, “this kind of inequality in the credit system is wrong,” how do we
answer, in terms of methodology and shared consensus on values? We tend to
base our views on access to credit on what we feel is right, but this is not good
enough for policy making because it fails to offer a route to a consensus.
Lawmakers and regulators will not take equality seriously without a methodology
for assessing it.
The current prevalent approach to regulatory evaluation is cost benefit
analysis. Not all financial regulation is evaluated using explicit application of cost
benefit analysis, but it can come into regulation implicitly because some
regulators will apply it conceptually in the exercise of expert judgment.62 One
significant problem for cost benefit analysis is the interpersonal aggregation
problem: it aggregates costs and benefits across everyone regardless of their luck,
circumstances, position in society, historic injustice, and so on. Interpersonal
aggregation is morally problematic because small benefits of a regulation
accruing to large numbers of people can be permissibly aggregated to outweigh
disproportionate burdens imposed on a lower number of particular persons. Let
us assume that there are two benefits to access to credit, one direct and the other
indirect. The direct benefit is access to credit itself. The indirect benefit is
stability—the idea that lending should not endanger the economy by imposing
externalities in the form of systemic risk on everyone. Conceptually, cost benefit
analysis without appropriate modification—assuming it can be modified without
jeopardizing its validity—is entirely insensitive to inequality. In theory, we could
design a very stable credit market by cutting out the poor or even a good chunk
of the middle class entirely. Cost benefit analysis could permit access to credit
institutions that would prohibit all mortgage lending to anyone that earns an
income of less than $250,000 if it maximized both direct and indirect benefits. We
would likely have a very stable financial system if we cut the poor and most of
the middle class out of the credit markets. But given the way American society
pegs wealth to access at least to mortgage credit, this approach would be very
unjust. The point I make here is simply that the current tools to evaluate financial
regulation are insensitive to inequality. I do not argue this set of facts is true but

62. For recent discussions, see generally John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial
Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882 (2015) (discussing cost benefit analysis of
financial regulation).
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only that it would be a sound result for cost benefit analysis if the numbers hold.
Not all harms are equal if we take distributive justice into account.
There is evidence that the failure to take equality into account in postfinancial crisis regulation of mortgage lending continues to have adverse effects
on lower-income households. A study by Laurie Goodman of the Urban
Institute, for example, informs that the current rules impose substantial and
disproportionate burdens on the less well-off to maintain stability in the financial
system.63 Goodman has found that mortgage credit has tightened up considerably
since the financial crisis. According to Goodman “[m]any loans are not being
made that should be.”64 There has been a decline in home ownership in the
United States and a shrinkage of credit.65 We need the methodological toolkit to
evaluate these findings to get at “distributional concerns” beyond facile
descriptions.
Two principles of justice can be deployed to evaluate access to credit
institutions. One well-understood moral principle relevant to law and public
policy is the difference principle: an institution such as a statute or regulation that
creates or perpetuates inequality is morally permissible (or at least not morally
wrong) if it makes persons who are less well-off better off.66 The difference
principle can be understood as a priority for those who are worse off.
One way to develop a method to put into play a priority for the worse off is
through what philosopher Frances Kamm calls pairwise comparisons.67 In
evaluating any law or policy on access to credit, one compares individuals, one at
a time, to see how worse or better off they would be with the law or policy.68 This
may seem a daunting task, but in a time of big data, algorithmic decision tools,
and lots of demographic data at hand, pairwise comparison methods should be
feasible. The individualist restriction could be somewhat relaxed in the financial
context, as like individuals and households often share like circumstances.
With the moral idea of a priority for the worse off implemented in pairwise
comparisons, relatively low net worth households have standing to object to
mortgage lending policies that place undue burdens on their access to mortgages.
What constitutes an undue burden is open to debate, though the argument that
access to credit and overall financial stability are tradeoffs is now thoroughly

63. Laurie S. Goodman, Quantifying the Tightness of Mortgage Credit and Assessing Policy Actions,
37 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 235 (2017).
64. Id. at 238.
65. See id. at 239–40 (“[L]ow credit borrowers make up a shrinking share of a shrinking bucket.”);
Jonathan Spader & Christopher Herbert, Waiting for Homeownership: Assessing the Future of
Homeownership, 2015-2035, 37 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 267 (2017) (“In the face of the decade-long decline
in homeownership, considerable uncertainty continues to exist about both the factors that have
contributed to the decline and the homeownership rate’s future trajectory.”).
66. I have not hewed closely to Rawls’s formulation. As I have said, I do not owe strict allegiance
to Rawls.
67. FRANCES M. KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND PERMISSIBLE
HARM 57 (2007).
68. Id.
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debunked.69 We are not dealing with cheap credit or irresponsible, risky lending
here. Stability problems can be mitigated through appropriate measures above
the level of retail finance, in the intermediation market. The burdens on lower
income households caused by restrictions on access to credit include a diminished
net worth, a decline in intergenerational flourishing, limited ability to place
children in adequate schools, and so on. Higher income households benefit little
from access to credit reform. They tend to be less leveraged and with little
mortgage debt. Higher net worth households have diversified portfolios and are
usually able to bear risk relatively well compared to lower net worth households.
Higher income households tend to be, in essence, savers who invest in the
mortgage debt of lower income households and therefore often benefit from
access to credit.70
The above sketch of an approach is not cost benefit analysis. It accords with
what in philosophy is known as the separateness of persons requirement or the
individualist restriction.71 Pairwise comparison requires that each individual be
compared to each other individual. That we might make the analysis more
tractable by comparing archetypes or representative individuals should hardly
matter in the lending context.
Another principle of justice that could be put to work in evaluating access to
credit institutions is the fair equality of opportunity principle, which provides that
persons with the same natural endowments and willingness to use them should
have the same economic opportunities regardless of whether they are rich or
poor. Low income cannot determine, on a moral basis, whether a person enjoys
the benefits of access to credit, nor, if access to credit is a social primary good,
can it restrict homeownership. Equality of opportunity is no doubt at work in
many policy approaches aimed at access to credit. The claim for fair equality of
opportunity could be more clearly articulated, perhaps to apply more clearly to
all forms of inequality, to include material inequality.
Finally, anticipating dubious arguments that this Article advocates socialism
for credit institutions, it does nothing of the sort. If anything, the effect of these
measures to improve equality in the credit system would be to promote what
Rawls called a property owning democracy: a pro-market, pro-private ownership
approach requiring widespread and dispersed ownership of property and capital
and not concentrated interests, so as to avoid situations of domination that will
distort democratic processes. The ideas in this Article align closely to New Deal

69. Access to credit can be designed so that lower income households have access to credit without
threatening financial stability. This is not about cheap credit or irresponsible lending. The claim that the
last housing bubble was in some measure caused by easy lending incentivized by the Community
Reinvestment Act has been thoroughly refuted. See Neil Bhutta & Daniel Ringo, Assessing the
Community Reinvestment Act’s Role in the Financial Crisis, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RSRV. SYS.
(May 26, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2015/assessing-the-comm
unity-reinvestment-acts-role-in-the-financial-crisis-20150526.html [https://perma.cc/YW8V-ESKA].
70. ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT: HOW THEY (AND YOU) CAUSED THE GREAT
RECESSION, AND HOW WE CAN PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN 50, 54–55 (2014).
71. Kamm, supra note 67.
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policy values that have formed the basis for much of the American basic structure
of society, but which are being demolished today. If we do not undertake the
policy innovations sketched out in this article, we risk aggravating inequality even
more. The result will not be a priority for the worse off but rather one for the
better off, a wrong direction that inverts the social contract. This inversion
converts public duties of justice owed to individuals to private duties of contract
owed by individuals, aggravating power and domination dynamics in a society
and worsening inequality and its deleterious effects.
IV
CONCLUSION
At best, we are in the nascent stages of developing methods for evaluating access
to credit from the standpoint of equality. What is on offer here is mainly an
attempt to clarify what should be valued in institutional reform. From the
standpoint of institutional change, we have only started the work on status
inequality and have done next to nothing about material inequality. Discussions
of inequality sometimes produce a more radical approach of suggesting a more
significant restructuring of housing and other markets to “de-financialize” the
citizen. Here I make a modest plea to work internally and to leave the basic
structure of private home ownership and private credit intact. Justice is a first
priority for a society and its law. Tackling inequality is one of the most important
social goals for our time and it requires a focus on how we distribute credit in
American society.

